A novel phase transition behavior is observed in the Kolkata Paise Restaurant problem where large number (N ) of agents or customers or players collectively (and iteratively) learn to choose among the N unranked restaurants where she would be alone that evening and would get the only dish available there that evening (or may get randomly picked up if more than one customer arrive there that evening). The players evolve their strategy such that the publicly available information about past crowd in different restaurants can be utilized and each of them are able to make the best minority choice. Following a crowd-avoiding strategy indicated above, each of the n i (t − 1) number of agents arriving at the i-th restaurant in the last (t − 1)-th evening chooses this t-th evening to go back to the same i-th restaurant with weight [n i (t − 1)] −α and with weight 1/(N − 1) for the other restaurants. We study the steady state (t-independent) utilization fraction f of
I. INTRODUCTION
We study the steady state statistics and the phase transition behavior of the Kolkata Paise Restaurant (KPR) problem [1, 2] . KPR is a well-studied many-agent (player) and many-choice repeated game, where the agents collectively learn from past mistakes, how to share the limited resources. In this kind of games, each agent tries to anticipate and choose her own strategy, every time (learning from the publicly available past informations) in parallel mode (unguided; in absence of any dictator or non-playing instructor). The restaurants are assumed to prepare every evening fixed meal plates which are equally priced (hence no budget constraint for customers). Only the crowd avoidance abilities determines the individual success in securing meal on any or successive evenings.
Specifically, we consider here the case of N restaurants and N agents or customers or players who decide every evening (on the basis of informations about the past evenings, available to everyone), which restaurant to choose such that she is alone there and gets the meal. Each restaurant is assumed to, for simplicity, prepare one dish every evening (generalization does not help getting any insight at this stage). For more than one person arriving any restaurant any evening, a randomly chosen one will get the meal and rest (arriving there) will not get any that evening. We do not consider any ranking of these restaurants here.
Although every evening each of the N restaurants prepares one dish and in-principle everyone is entitled to a dish every evening, overcrowding due to stochasticity of choices make the probability of success for each customer less than unity in such (democratic) games. Indeed, a dictated solution would be very efficient: the dictator asks everyone to form a queue and visit the restaurants according to the position in the queue and then asks them to shift her position by one step in the next evening (assuming periodic boundary condition). Everyone gets the food: No wastage, i.e., the steady state (t-independent) utilization fraction f = 1 (where
δ(n) = 1,0 for n = 0,1 respectively) and that too from the first evening (convergence time τ is zero). This is true even when the restaurants have ranks (agreed by all the agents or customers).
However, in democracy, this dictated solution is not acceptable and each agent would like to (learn from past experience and) decide on her own everytime which restaurant to choose such that she is alone there and gets the meal. The more successful such collective learning is, the more is the utilization fraction of the services. Question is, what is the maximum utilization fraction value (f ) and convergence time (τ ) of such 'learned' democratic choices (due to individually learned strategies) for a large society (N → ∞). Note that the dictated solution gives full utilization (f = 1) and zero convergence time (τ = 0) for any N .
Assuming that no past history on restaurant occupancy is available i.e., no learning, let us consider the process of randomly choosing any of the N restaurant by λN agents (we consider λ = 1 in KPR game later). Then the probability of choosing any restaurant by m (> 1) agents on evening t is P (m) = As we mentioned earlier, the agents try to learn from the past mistakes in making their respective choices and can improve her chance to be in the minority with efficient learning strategy. We study here the dynamics of the game with one such stochastic learning strategy.
II. LEARNING STRATEGY
We study the dynamics of KPR game played by N players or agents such that each evening each of the players employ some stochastic (learning) strategy, helping her to choose among N number of (equally ranked) restaurants, maximizing her chance of arriving at a vacant restaurant and get the dish. We employ the following strategy: on day t, an agent goes back to her last day's visited restaurant k with probability P k (t) = [n k (t − 1)] −α , if she was one of the n k (t − 1) agents arriving there (k-th restaurant) last night. She chooses one among the rest of the (N − 1) equi-probable restaurants k ( = k) with probability P k (t) = (1 − P k (t))/(N − 1). If α = 0, then every evening she will return to the first day's chosen and visited restaurant, and the dynamics on successive days become trivial. In this simulation study with α > 0, we found the steady state (for t ≥ τ (α), the convergence time) value of the aggregated utilization fraction f = 1.0 for α → α c , where α c = 0 + .
We find the power laws 
III. SUMMARY & DISCUSSION
Social dynamics is a popular area of study which borrows techniques from statistical mechanics to study the aggregated behavior of collective learning dynamics, based on individually chosen strategy to be in the minority. We study the collective learning induced phase transition in the Kolkata Paise Restaurant (KPR) problem where N customers or players every evening choose one of the N restaurants with the hope that she gets the only dish available in that restaurant that evening (if reaches there alone or one is randomly picked up by the restaurant if more than one customer arrive on evening) by evolving her strategy and based on the publicly available information of past crowds for all the restaurants. The social utilization fraction
where n i (t) represents the number of customers who choose the i-th restaurant for t-th evening (δ(n) = 1 for n = 0 and δ(n) = 0 for n > 0). The steady state corresponds to the case when f (t) = f becomes t-independent (within limit). We show using Monte Carlo simulation, that when each agent chooses the restaurant i depending on the past choice with probability
for the i-th restaurant where she landed up last evening (t − 1) along with [n i (t − 1) − 1] others,
and α c = 0 + (see Fig. 1 ), while the convergence time τ (when f becomes τ independent, on average) grows as (α − α c ) −γ , with γ 1.66 (see Fig. 2 ) and the fluctuation (∆τ ) in τ diverges as (α − α c ) −γ withγ 1.33 around α → α c = 0 + (see Fig. 3 ).
Earlier works [1, 3, 4] had already proposed several strategies to maximize the average social utilization fraction f (see refs. [5] [6] [7] [8] for further applications of the model in practical situations).
In this paper, we discuss a competitive resource allocation process such that following the proposed learning rule (see section II), the process exhibits a phase transition at the critical point α = α c which we find to be 0 + numerically (see Figs. 1-3 ): The value of f approaches unity as α → α c (= 0 + , see Fig. 1 ) following a power law and the convergence time τ grows very fast following another power law (see Fig. 2 ) as α approaches α c . We hope, further studies on this phase transition behavior for the practical cases considered in refs. [5] [6] [7] [8] will contribute significantly in social science. However such studies also face the formidable challenges to accommodate effectively the ranking of the restaurants, which we have not considered here.
